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1 Introduction
What are the philosophical views of contemporary professional philosophers? And how do
these views change over time?
In November 2009, we carried out the first PhilPapers Survey. We surveyed 931 philoso-
phers from 99 philosophy departments in the Australia, Canada, continental Europe, New
Zealand, the US, and the UK on their answers to 30 philosophical questions. The results
of this survey were published as “What Do Philosophers’ Believe?”1 and have been widely
discussed.
In October 2020, we carried out a follow-up survey: the 2020 PhilPapers Survey. It was
intended to make at least three additional contributions.
First: the 2020 Survey allowed longitudinal comparisons of results in 2009 and 2020,
giving information about how the views of professional philosophers have changed over
time.
Second: the target population for the survey was enlarged from faculty members of
99 selected departments in a few selected countries, to a broader group including English-
language-publishing philosophers from around the world. This allows broader information
about views within the English-speaking philosophical community.
Third: the list of questions was expanded from 30 questions to 100 questions, allowing
information about a broader range of philosophical topics.
As we argued in “What Do Philosophers Believe?”, surveys like this can play at least
three roles within philosophy. First, today’s sociology is tomorrow’s history, and these results
may be of some use to future historians of philosophy. Second, philosophers often appeal
to sociological claims about the distributions of views among philosophers, for example in
justifying which views should be taken seriously, and it makes sense for these claims to
be well-grounded. Third, if philosophy has any tendency to converge to the truth, then
∗This is an early draft. Feedback and suggestions for further analyses are welcome. Thanks to the staff
of the Centre for Digital Philosophy, the many philosophers who helped develop and beta test the survey,
and the many philosophers who took the time to answer the survey.
1David Bourget and David J. Chalmers, ”What Do Philosophers Believe”, Philosophical Studies 170(3):
465-500, 2014
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philosophers’ views might provide some guidance about the truth of philosophical views.
It is not clear whether philosophy tends to converge to the truth, so we don’t make the
third claim about guidance, but surveys can clearly play the first two roles in philosophical
practice.
We begin by describing the methodology for the survey, including the target population
and the questions. We then go on to discuss the main results of the 2020 survey, the
longitudinal comparison to the 2009 survey, and correlations between answers to the survey.
We end with a discussion of selection bias in the group of respondents and of correcting
results to remove this bias.
2 Methodology
The PhilPapers Survey was conducted online from October 15, 2020 to November 16, 2020.
Full details on the methods and the results can be found on the survey website at sur-
vey2020.philpeople.org.
2.1 Target population
In the 2009 survey, we were restricted to a relatively small group of departments (based
mainly on rankings and faculty lists from the Philosophical Gourmet Report) as this is
where we had the most information. In 2020, the PhilPeople database includes information
on philosophers and philosophy departments around the world (with strongest coverage on
English-speaking and English-publishing philosophers), so we could survey a broader and
more representative group.
After a period of consultation, we decided on a target group including (1) in Australia,
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK, and the US: all regular faculty members (tenure-
track or permanent) in BA-granting philosophy departments with four or more members
(according to the PhilPeople database); and (2) in all other countries: English-publishing
philosophers in BA-granting philosophy departments with four or more English-publishing
faculty members. Here an English-publishing philosopher is someone with one or more
publications in the PhilPapers database with a wide range of English-language journals
and book publishers. We restricted to English-publishing philosophers as we do not have
adequate information on philosophers who do not publish in English, and the majority of
our questions are drawn from English-language traditions.
For meaningful longitudinal comparisons, we also designated a “2009-comparable depart-
ments” target group of 100 departments in the same regions as the 2009 survey, based largely
on rankings (all Ph.D.-granting departments with a 2017-2018 Philosophical Gourmet Re-
port score of 1.9 or above, plus two leading departments with MA programs and a selected
group of European departments based on expert recommendations). This group was used
only for longitudinal comparisons.
After data entry and cleanup, our target population included 7685 philosophers, includ-
ing 6112 in group (1) and 1573 in group (2). The 2009-comparable target group included
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Figure 1: Example survey form for one philosophical question
2407 philosophers. We used data entry from departmental websites to make our information
as complete as possible, but inevitably the information is imperfect in multiple ways. Every
member of the target group was sent an initial email invitation to take the survey, followed
by additional email requests after approximately 10 days and 20 days if they had not yet
responded.
2.2 Philosophical questions
In the 2009 survey, we asked 30 questions each with 2-4 answer options: for example, “God:
theism or atheism” and “Mind: physicalism or nonphysicalism”.
In the 2020 survey, we used the 30 questions from the 2009 survey unaltered, to allow
meaningful longitudinal comparisons. We expanded the list of 30 questions to a list of 40
main questions that would be asked of all participants. We also added a further group of 60
additional (often more specialized) questions that would be asked to one-sixth of participants
each. As a result, each participant was asked to answer a minimum of 50 questions (40 main
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Figure 2: Selecting combinations of answers
questions and 10 additional questions). Participants were also given the option of answering
some or all of the other 50 additional questions if they chose to, with a maximum of 100
philosophical questions per participant.
We determined the 70 new questions through an extended period of consultation, includ-
ing consultation with PhilPapers editors and extended discussion on social media including
PhilPeople, Facebook, and philosophy blogs. We also had a lengthy period of beta testing
the survey questions and the survey interface with PhilPapers editors using the interface.
We aimed for questions that covered many areas of philosophy, that worked in the multiple
choice format, and that would be familiar to at least half of our target population.
The 100 resulting questions included approximately 50 questions drawn from metaphysics
and epistemology (broadly construed), 30 questions drawn from value theory, 9 from the
philosophy of science, logic, and mathematics, 6 from the history of philosophy, and 5 from
metaphilosophy.
As in 2009, we did not include any questions drawn from non-Western and non-analytic
traditions, as it proved too difficult to find questions from these traditions that met the
familiarity and multiple-choice constraints. We attempted to include some new questions
reflecting philosophy as it stands in 2020 (adding two questions each about gender and race,
for example), but we acknowledge an overall bias toward certain relatively traditional issues
in the analytic and English-speaking canons. In retrospect, we could have done more to
reflect the diversity of contemporary philosophy. In future surveys, we will try to do so.
As in 2009, we allowed respondents to indicate that they “accept” or “lean toward” a
view, and we allowed a range of other options. The options are shown in figure 1. We
changed the 2009 answer options slightly to allow respondents more fine-grained options in
endorsing multiple answers. Where the 2009 survey just had an option for “Accept both”
(binary questions) or “Accept more than one” (ternary questions), the 2020 survey allowed
respondents to accept, reject, or lean toward or against each answer separately if they chose




Respondents were asked the following questions about their philosophical orientation:
Areas of specialization: Respondents had to choose from the following list of areas (the
primary areas in the PhilPapers category system): 17th/18th Century Philosophy, 19th
Century Philosophy, 20th Century Philosophy, Aesthetics, African/Africana Philosophy,
Ancient Greek Philosophy, Applied Ethics, Asian Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Deci-
sion Theory, Epistemology, European Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, General Philosophy
of Science, Logic and Philosophy of Logic, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, Meta-
ethics, Metaphilosophy, Metaphysics, Normative Ethics, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy
of Biology, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Computing and Information,
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Law,
Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Physical Science, Philos-
ophy of Religion, Philosophy of Social Science, Philosophy of the Americas, Social and
Political Philosophy.
Philosophical tradition: As in 2009, respondents could choose either “analytic”, “conti-
nental”, or “other tradition”. When selecting “other tradition” they could enter a tradition
as free text.
Identification with philosophers: Respondents were asked “For which nonliving philoso-
phers X would you describe yourself or your work as X-ian, or the equivalent?” Respondents
could choose from a list of well-known philosophers or select “other” to specify philosophers
manually. The 2009 list was was based on online surveys of the greatest philosophers of the
last 200 years and of all time. It included: Anscombe, Aquinas, Aristotle, Augustine, Berke-
ley, Carnap, Davidson, Descartes, Frege, Hegel, Heidegger, Hobbes, Hume, Husserl, Kant,
Kierkegaard, Leibniz, Lewis, Locke, Marx, Mill, Moore, Nietzsche, Plato, Quine, Rawls,
Rousseau, Russell, Socrates, Spinoza, Wittgenstein. For 2020 we added Dewey, Foucault,
James, Merleau-Ponty, Peirce, Popper, Reid, Rorty, Sellars, and Whitehead (the ten most
popular write-in choices in 2009), Parfit and Putnam (the leading candidates per previous
criteria who died since the previous survey), and Arendt, Avicenna, Beauvoir, Buddha,
Confucius, Deleuze, Derrida, Du Bois, Laozi, Nagarjuna, Rand, Sartre, and Wollstonecraft
(to expand coverage of other traditions).
2.4 Background questions
Respondents were also asked the following background questions: year of birth, nationality,
gender, doctorate in philosophy (respondents could indicate that they hold a doctorate in
philosophy, and specify the granting institution and year), current affiliation and role.
2.5 Consent
Under consent guidelines approved by The Western University Non-Medical Research Ethics
Board, respondents were told how their answers would be used, and at the end of the sur-
vey were asked to consent to the use of their answers. The Survey was largely anonymous,
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although respondents were given the option to make their answers public eventually. Re-
spondents were also told that their answers would be retained for use in possible follow-up
surveys, and that any question could be skipped if they are uncomfortable in answering.
3 Main survey results
Of the main target population of 7685 philosophers, 1785 (23%) completed the survey. Of
these, 522 completed exactly 50 questions, 338 completed 51-99, and 925 completed all 100.
An additional 487 initially gave their consent but did not complete the survey.
Of the 2009-comparable population of 2407 philosophers, 648 (27%) completed the sur-
vey. Of these, 193 completed exactly 50 questions, 116 completed 51-99, and 339 completed
all 100.
The results presented below are results for all questions answered by all respondents
who completed the survey. These results are therefore subject to possible selection bias
both among respondents to the survey and among respondents who chose to complete more
than 50 questions. We discuss and analyze these sorts of selection bias in section 7.
3.1 Main questions
The results for the main 40 questions are shown below. 30 of these questions overlap with
the questions from the 2009 PhilPapers Survey and 10 are new. Each of these 40 questions
was presented to all 1785 survey respondents. The figures below include all respondents
except those who indicated “insufficiently familiar with the issue” or who indicated “skip”
to skip the question.
Note that the results below should not be longitudinally compared to the main results
presented in the 2009 PhilPapers Survey paper, for three main reasons. First, the 2020
population is much broader (not restricted to 99 departments). Second, the 2020 survey
made it easier to endorse multiple answers than the 2009 survey. Third, the main results
presented in the 2009 paper included respondents who skipped the question or checked
“insufficiently familiar”, whereas the results below exclude those respondents.
For meaningful longitudinal comparisons, see section 5, where we present 2020 results
that are more directly comparable to the 2009 results (restricting to 2009-comparable de-
partments, exclusive answers, and including skip/unfamiliar answers under “other”).
In table 1, for each question and each option, we present the total number of respondents
and the percentage who either “accept” or “lean toward” that option. This figure can be
calculated either as an “inclusive” figure, where respondents who endorse multiple options
are included in the totals for each options, or as an “exclusive” figure, which counts only
respondents who endorse that option and no other option. We present inclusive figures in
all cases. To simplify the table, we present exclusive figures only when at least one of them
differs by 3% or more from inclusive figures. This gives some indication of questions for
which choosing multiple options is popular.
More information on combined and alternative answers can be found on the survey
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website on the pages presenting detailed results for each question. Main questions for
which combined answers were the most popular include: aim of philosophy (27%), gender
(20%), normative ethics (15%), race (10%), knowledge (8%), political philosophy (8%), and
vagueness (8%).
Among the 40 main questions, views mentioned most often as alternative answers (ac-
cording to a semi-automated analysis) included: abstract objects: Aristotelian realism (24
respondents, or 1.5%); aesthetic value: intersubjective (25); knowledge: pragmatism (30),
knowledge: Kantian (25), God: agnosticism (23); logic: pluralism (35); normative ethics:
pluralism (31), normative ethics: particularism (23), perceptual experience: direct realism
(23), perceptual experience: phenomenological (20), philosophical methods: phenomenology
(30), truth: pragmatism (26).
The cases of logic and normative ethics (as well as numerous cases discussed in the
next section) bring out that pluralist views were often expressed as alternative answers
rather than as combined answers (“Evaluate multiple options”). On the logic question,
for example, 76 respondents endorsed a combined answer (accepting or leaning toward
both classican and nonclassical logic) while 35 endorsed pluralism as an alternative answer.
Insofar as pluralism can be consideed a combined view, a consequence is that combined
answer numbers alone may somewhat understate the popularity of combined views, and
information on both alternative and combined answers is required for a full analysis.
Table 1: Main questions: Respondents who accept or lean toward each answer.
Questions and answers Inclusive Exclusive if diff.










Objective 740 43.5 683 40.2
Subjective 690 40.6 632 37.2
Other 322 18.9
Aim of philosophy (which is most important?)
Truth/knowledge 747 42.2 313 17.7
Understanding 988 55.8 524 29.6
Wisdom 552 31.2 178 10.1
Happiness 224 12.6 24 1.4




Questions and answers Inclusive Exclusive if diff.




Eating animals and animal products (is it permissi-
ble to eat animals and/or animal products in ordi-
nary circumstances?)
Omnivorism (yes and yes) 847 48.0
Vegetarianism (no and yes) 467 26.5
Veganism (no and no) 324 18.4
Other 174 9.9
Epistemic justification
Internalism 579 35.7 493 30.4
Externalism 819 50.5 735 45.3
Other 292 18.0







Non-skeptical realism 1403 79.5
Other 172 9.8
Footbridge (pushing man off bridge will save five on
track below, what ought one do?)
Push 382 22.0





No free will 197 11.2
Other 200 11.4
Gender
Biological 480 29.0 250 15.1
Psychological 356 21.5 71 4.3
Social 1043 63.1 711 43.0







Questions and answers Inclusive Exclusive if diff.







Empiricism 756 43.9 642 37.3







Classical 759 53.6 689 48.7
Non-classical 374 26.4 308 21.8
Other 342 24.2
Meaning of life
Subjective 570 33.0 489 28.3
Objective 553 32.1 476 27.6
Nonexistent 278 16.1 257 14.9
Other 407 23.6
Mental content
Internalism 399 26.4 332 21.9
Externalism 880 58.1 815 53.8
Other 297 19.6
Meta-ethics
Moral realism 1067 62.1















Questions and answers Inclusive Exclusive if diff.






One box 334 31.2
Two boxes 418 39.0
Other 323 30.2
Normative ethics
Deontology 558 32.1 343 19.7
Consequentialism 532 30.6 373 21.4
Virtue ethics 644 37.0 436 25.0
Other 316 18.2
Perceptual experience
Disjunctivism 207 15.6 183 13.8
Qualia theory 200 15.1 176 13.3
Representationalism 520 39.3 478 36.1
Sense-datum theory 66 5.0 51 3.9
Other 372 28.1
Personal identity
Biological view 308 19.1 252 15.6
Psychological view 705 43.7 637 39.4
Further-fact view 240 14.9 216 13.4
Other 429 26.6
Philosophical progress (is there any?)
None 68 3.8
A little 827 46.6
A lot 740 41.7
Other 149 8.4
Political philosophy
Communitarianism 419 27.3 339 22.1
Egalitarianism 677 44.0 588 38.3







Biological 308 18.7 189 11.5
Social 1046 63.4 871 52.8
Unreal 248 15.0 188 11.4
Other 219 13.3
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Questions and answers Inclusive Exclusive if diff.
n % n %
Science
Scientific realism 1222 72.4










Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side
track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?)
Switch 1101 63.4
Don’t switch 231 13.3
Other 407 23.4
Truth
Correspondence 844 51.4 794 48.3
Deflationary 403 24.5 365 22.2
Epistemic 167 10.2 144 8.8
Other 276 16.8
Vagueness
Epistemic 346 24.2 233 16.3
Metaphysical 298 20.8 217 15.2




Conceivable but not pos. 588 36.5
Metaphysically possible 393 24.4
Other 362 22.5
Philosophical methods (which methods are the most
useful/important?)
Reject/lean against
Conceptual analysis 1229 70.9 201 11.6
Conceptual engineering 684 39.5 357 20.6
Empirical philosophy 1040 60.0 251 14.5
Experimental philosophy 565 32.6 623 35.9
Formal philosophy 962 55.5 223 12.9
Intuition-based philosophy 857 49.5 503 29.0




Of the 60 additional questions, one-sixth of the 1785 respondents, or about 300 respondents,
were presented with the question as part of their mandatory 50 questions. Typically, another
800 respondents (45%) were presented with the question by answering additional questions,
for a total of around 1100 respondents (62%) presented with the question. The figures below
include these respondents, excluding those who chose to skip the question or who indicated
“insufficiently familiar”. As before, the results are subject to selection bias, discussed in
section 7.
Additional questions for which combined answers were the most popular include: argu-
ments for theism (18%), method in history (15%), response to skepticism (8%), method in
political philosophy (7%), Wittgenstein (7%), and units of selection (7%).
Views mentioned most often as alternative answers included: arguments for theism: none
(32 respondents, or 3.2%)), consciousness: hylomorphism (12), foundations of mathematics:
Platonism (15), method in history of philosophy: both (15), method in political philosophy:
both (13), statue and lump: nihilism (10), units of selection: multilevel selection (29), units
of selection: groups (11), well-being: hybrid (13): Wittgenstein: neither (29), Wittgenstein:
both (14). As in the previous section, it is evident that combined views (e.g. ”both”,
”hybrid”, ”multilevel”) were often expressed by alternative answers as well as by combined
answers.
Table 2: Additional questions: Respondents who accept or lean toward each answer.
Questions and answers Inclusive Exclusive if diff.
n % n %





Perception 193 28.2 171 25.0
Pleasure 97 14.2 76 11.1
Sui generis 255 37.2 245 35.8
Other 167 24.4
Analysis of knowledge
Justified true belief 242 23.6
Other analysis 330 32.2
No analysis 314 30.6
Other 142 13.9
Arguments for theism (which argument is strongest?)
Cosmological 214 20.9 170 16.6
Design 181 17.7 142 13.9
Ontological 91 8.9 70 6.8
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Questions and answers Inclusive Exclusive if diff.
n % n %
Pragmatic 146 14.2 119 11.6
Moral 96 9.4 65 6.3
Other 258 25.2










Counterfactual/difference-making 332 37.2 298 33.4
Process/production 201 22.5 167 18.7
Primitive 183 20.5 169 18.9




Doesn’t understand 692 67.1
Other 154 14.9
Concepts
Nativism 241 28.1 200 23.3
Empiricism 432 50.3 387 45.1
Other 215 25.1
Consciousness
Dualism 224 22.0 204 20.0
Eliminativism 46 4.5 39 3.8
Functionalism 337 33.0 301 29.5
Identity theory 136 13.3 117 11.5
Panpsychism 77 7.5 62 6.1
Other 232 22.7





Cosmological fine-tuning (what explains it?)
Design 140 17.3
Multiverse 122 15.1
Brute fact 259 32.1
No fine-tuning 175 21.7
Other 144 17.8
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Questions and answers Inclusive Exclusive if diff.










Constructivism/intuitionism 92 15.3 82 13.7
Formalism 37 6.2 31 5.2
Logicism 71 11.8 62 10.3
Structuralism 127 21.2 107 17.8








Causal/teleological 249 34.7 214 29.8
Inferential 68 9.5 48 6.7
Interpretational 108 15.1 87 12.1
Phenomenal 90 12.6 72 10.0
Primitive 98 13.7 89 12.4
Other 160 22.3








Hume (what is his view?)
Skeptic 318 36.5 252 28.9
Naturalist 479 54.9 413 47.4
Other 138 15.8





Questions and answers Inclusive Exclusive if diff.
n % n %
Interlevel metaphysics (which is the most useful?)
Grounding 218 29.1 167 22.3
Identity 86 11.5 51 6.8
Realization 157 21.0 106 14.2
Supervenience 185 24.7 138 18.4
Other 212 28.3
Justification
Coherentism 225 23.7 182 19.2
Infinitism 19 2.0 14 1.5
Nonreliabilist foundationalism 239 25.2 207 21.8
Reliabilism 319 33.6 274 28.8
Other 207 21.8
Kant (what is his view?)
One world 328 45.4
Two worlds 252 34.9
Other 145 20.1
Law
Legal positivism 244 39.5








Heavyweight realism 272 38.6
Deflationary realism 198 28.1
Anti-realism 84 11.9
Other 152 21.6
Method in history of philosophy (which do you pre-
fer?)
Analytic/rational reconstruction 569 60.8 402 42.9
Contextual/historicist 416 44.4 251 26.8
Other 112 12.0
Method in political philosophy (which do you pre-
fer?)
Ideal theory 255 32.4 176 22.4
Non-ideal theory 456 58.0 377 48.0
Other 148 18.8




Questions and answers Inclusive Exclusive if diff.
n % n %
Other 187 18.4
Moral principles
Moral generalism 537 54.6
Moral particularism 332 33.7
Other 127 12.9
Morality
Non-naturalism 272 26.6 248 24.2
Naturalist realism 324 31.6 288 28.1
Constructivism 213 20.8 181 17.7
Expressivism 109 10.6 84 8.2
Error theory 54 5.3 40 3.9
Other 119 11.6
Normative concepts (which is most fundamental?)
Fit 63 7.3 43 5.0
Ought 122 14.2 91 10.6
Reasons 219 25.4 185 21.5






Philosophical knowledge (is there any?)
None 40 3.6
A little 361 32.5
A lot 624 56.2
Other 90 8.1
Plato (what is his view?)
Knowledge only of forms 335 52.8
Knowledge also of concrete things 179 28.2
Other 122 19.2
Politics
Capitalism 323 29.5 286 26.1








Aristotelian 344 38.7 305 34.3
Humean 272 30.6 251 28.3
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Questions and answers Inclusive Exclusive if diff.
n % n %
Kantian 168 18.9 141 15.9
Other 143 16.1






Immanent universals 160 20.6





Dispositional 250 31.5 205 25.8
Phenomenal 55 6.9 35 4.4
Representational 369 46.5 325 40.9




Structured entities 311 38.3





Collapse 95 17.1 82 14.7
Hidden-variables 122 21.9 104 18.7
Many-worlds 108 19.4 95 17.1












Response to external-world skepticism (which is
strongest?)
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Questions and answers Inclusive Exclusive if diff.
n % n %
Abductive 206 22.1 160 17.2
Contextualist 100 10.7 72 7.7
Dogmatist 125 13.4 94 10.1
Epistemic externalist 176 18.9 136 14.6
Semantic externalist 78 8.4 50 5.4
Pragmatic 212 22.8 170 18.3
Other 160 17.2
Semantic content (which expressions are context-
dependent?)




Radical contextualism (most or all) 199 25.5
Other 102 13.1
Sleeping beauty (woken once if heads, woken twice if









One thing 288 30.1





Growing block 125 17.0
Other 183 24.9
Theory of reference
Causal 406 46.3 360 41.0
Descriptive 194 22.1 149 17.0
Deflationary 132 15.1 123 14.0
Other 189 21.6
Time travel
Metaphysically possible 401 42.3




Possible but non-actual 44 4.8
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Questions and answers Inclusive Exclusive if diff.




Genes 297 43.5 225 33.0
Organisms 294 43.1 223 32.7
Other 159 23.3
Values in science (is ideal scientific reasoning neces-
sarily sensitive or insensitive to non-epistemic val-
ues?)
Necessarily value-free 170 17.7
Necessarily value-laden 423 44.0
Can be either 299 31.1
Other 69 7.2
Well-being
Hedonism/experientialism 123 12.7 98 10.1
Desire satisfaction 180 18.6 146 15.1
Objective list 514 53.2 483 49.9
Other 194 20.1
Wittgenstein (which do you prefer?)
Early 237 24.6 200 20.8
Late 554 57.5 515 53.5
Other 166 17.2
Other minds (for which groups are some members
conscious?)
Reject/lean against
Adult humans 1039 95.1 2 0.2
Cats 967 88.6 43 3.9
Fish 713 65.3 161 14.7
Flies 377 34.5 419 38.4
Worms 264 24.2 509 46.6
Plants 79 7.2 870 79.7
Particles 22 2.0 973 89.1
Newborn babies 921 84.3 53 4.9
Current ai systems 37 3.4 900 82.4




Each respondent is associated with up to three countries: nationality, country of PhD,
country of affiliation. The USA is far ahead on all three lists, followed by the UK, followed by
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Australia, Canada, and Germany in varying orders, and then numerous European countries.
The leading non-European countries (aside from Australia, Canada, NZ, and the US) were
Israel, Brazil, and Colombia (nationality), and Israel, Brazil, Singapore, Hong Kong, South
Africa, and Mexico (affiliation).
4.2 Gender and age
Just over 20% of respondents who indicated gender indicated gender: female, while about
0.5% indicated gender: other, with the rest indicating gender: male. The most common
decade of birth was the 1970s, followed by the 1980s and the 1960s.
4.3 Philosophical orientation
The most common areas of specialization (in order) were epistemology, metaphysics, norma-
tive ethics, and philosophy of mind. A large majority of respondents specified an analytic
orientation, followed by continental orientation, and write-in choices including pragmatism,
history, and a number identifying with multiple orientations. On identification with non-
living philosophers, the leaders included Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, Lewis, and
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Table 4: Country of PhD














Figure 3: Decade of birth






















Prefer not to say 25
Other gender 9
No answer 29










Quine, with many write-in options included.
5 Longitudinal analysis
In this section we compare the 2020 results for the 30 main questions to the 2009 results.
For this purpose, we restrict the 2020 results to the target group of 100 2009-comparable
departments in Australasia, Europe, and North America. As explained in section 2, the
2009-comparable departments, like the target departments in the 2009 survey, were selected
based largely on rankings.
It should be noted that the “2009-comparable department” group differs systematically
from the broader target population in a number of respects. Demographically, it includes
a higher proportion of UK-based philosophers and analytic-tradition philosophers than the
target population. Philosophically, it includes a lower proportion of theists, along with many
other differences evident in comparing 2020 results in table 1 (all departments) to table 9
(2009-comparable departments).
For longitudinal purposes, we use “exclusive” rather than “inclusive” answer figures:
that is, we exclude respondents who endorse multiple options. Exclusive answers were
used in presenting our 2009 results, so using them here maximizes continuity with existing
familiar results. Furthermore, inclusive answers were handled somewhat differently in 2009
and 2020, so using exclusive answers maximizes comparability of the results. Using them
should make no difference to relative results on binary questions (though absolute results are
lower in some cases, as multiple options could be chosen more easily in 2020 than in 2009).
On nonbinary questions, this method sets aside fine-grained information about respondents
who endorse some but not all of the options; but since this fine-grained information was
not available in the 2009 survey, it would be hard to use it for longitudinal purposes. We
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Figure 4: Areas of specialization
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Table 7: Philosophers most identified with
Aristotle (238) Davidson (44) Sellars (16)
Hume (221) Leibniz (41) Nāgārjuna (15)
Kant (188) Anscombe (39) Du Bois (13)
Wittgenstein (117) Nietzsche (39) Rorty (13)
Lewis (117) Moore (39) Sartre (13)
Quine (107) Hegel (38) Berkeley (12)
Frege (95) Heidegger (34) Austin (9)
Carnap (80) Locke (33) Wollstonecraft (9)
Russell (80) Husserl (33) Grice (8)
Plato (74) Spinoza (32) Derrida (8)
Rawls (71) Reid (32) Whitehead (7)
Mill (67) Merleau-Ponty (28) Rousseau (7)
Aquinas (56) Foucault (27) Sidgwick (7)
Marx (52) Beauvoir (26) Confucius (7)
Socrates (49) Peirce (26) Ramsey (6)
Descartes (48) Augustine (23) Buddha (6)
James (47) Kierkegaard (22) Zhuangzi (6)
Parfit (46) Arendt (18) Schopenhauer (6)
Dewey (45) Popper (18) Deleuze (5)
Putnam (44) Hobbes (16) Dummett (5)
have also included “skip” and “insufficiently familiar” answers as “other” answers in this
context, to maximize continuity with how results were presented in 2009.
Our main longitudinal measure is the swing toward or against a position on the survey,
defined as its relative strength in 2020 minus its relative strength in 2009. The relative
strength of a position on a survey is defined as the percentage of respondents who endorse
it exclusively, minus the average percentage of respondents who endorse other options ex-
clusively (averaged across all other options). There is no perfect measure of swing when
more than two options are present, but our definition has the nice feature that all swings
on a given question sum to zero. Furthermore, in cases where all positions increase by the
same amount (5%, say), as discussed above, the swing toward each position will be zero.
The biggest swings toward any position from 2009 to 2020 are shown on table 8.
We also have the information to longitudinally compare results over the same people
in 2009 and 2020: that is, over 2009 respondents in the target group who also responded
in 2020 (regardless of whether they were in the target group in 2020). We have included
these “same people” results with a corresponding swing, to shed light on the issue of how
individual views may change over time. The biggest swings for this longitudinal comparison
can be found in table 9.
The survey website includes some further longitudinal comparisons, including compar-
isons across “same departments” (the 2009 departments in both 2009 and 2020) . It also
includes comparisons using “weighted scores” (0 for rejecting a view, 0.25 for leaning against
it, 0.5 for other, 0.75 for leaning toward it, 1 for accepting it), which are more fine-grained
than the current percentages which in effect assign 0 for the first three options and 1 for the
last two.
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Table 8: Largest swings from 2009 to 2020 across comparable departments.
Answer Swing
Logic: non-classical 13.4
Knowledge claims: invariantism -11.2
Moral motivation: externalism 8.7
Laws of nature: Humean 8.5
A priori knowledge: yes 8.5
Knowledge claims: contextualism 7.6
Aesthetic value: subjective 6.9
Trolley problem: don’t switch 6.3
Meta-ethics: moral realism 5.4
Free will: compatibilism 5.3
Table 9: Largest swings from 2009 to 2020 across the same people (target 2009 respondents
who also responded in 2020).
Answer Swing
Trolley problem: don’t switch 11.9
Logic: non-classical 9.5
Moral judgment: non-cognitivism 8.3
Knowledge claims: invariantism -8.2
Abstract objects: Platonism 7.7
Normative ethics: virtue ethics 6.5
Knowledge claims: contextualism 6.1
Normative ethics: consequentialism -5.9
Free will: no free will -5.9
Metaphilosophy: naturalism 5.6
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Table 10: Longitudinal comparison
Qs and As Comparable departments Same people
09% 20% ch. Swng 09% 20% ch. Swng
A priori knowledge
Yes 71.1 74.8 ⇑3.7 ⇑8.5 73.9 71.5 ⇓2.4 ⇓3.0
No 18.4 13.6 ⇓4.8 ⇓8.5 16.0 16.6 ⇑0.6 ⇑3.0
Other 10.5 11.6 10.1 11.9
Abstract objects
Platonism 39.3 37.2 ⇓2.1 ⇓1.2 37.1 39.5 ⇑2.4 ⇑7.7
Nominalism 37.7 36.7 ⇓1.0 ⇑1.2 39.5 34.1 ⇓5.4 ⇓7.7
Other 23.0 26.1 23.4 26.4
Aesthetic value
Objective 41.0 37.8 ⇓3.2 ⇓6.9 36.8 36.2 ⇓0.6 ⇑3.0
Subjective 34.5 38.1 ⇑3.6 ⇑6.9 39.8 36.2 ⇓3.6 ⇓3.0
Other 24.5 24.1 23.4 27.6
Analytic-synthetic distinction
Yes 64.9 63.7 ⇓1.2 ⇑5.3 65.0 64.1 ⇓0.9 ⇑3.9
No 27.1 20.7 ⇓6.4 ⇓5.3 26.7 22.0 ⇓4.7 ⇓3.9
Other 8.0 15.6 8.3 13.9
Epistemic justification
Internalism 26.4 27.9 ⇑1.5 ⇑1.4 30.0 30.6 ⇑0.6 ⇑3.6
Externalism 42.7 42.9 ⇑0.2 ⇓1.4 43.6 40.7 ⇓2.9 ⇓3.6
Other 30.9 29.2 26.4 28.7
External world
Idealism 4.3 4.0 ⇓0.3 ⇓0.8 2.7 4.2 ⇑1.5 ⇑2.2
Skepticism 4.8 4.3 ⇓0.5 ⇓1.1 5.9 6.5 ⇑0.6 ⇑0.9
Non-skeptical realism 81.6 83.2 ⇑1.6 ⇑1.9 81.9 79.8 ⇓2.1 ⇓3.1
Other 9.3 8.5 9.5 9.5
Free will
Compatibilism 59.1 62.8 ⇑3.7 ⇑5.3 60.8 62.0 ⇑1.2 ⇑3.9
Libertarianism 13.7 12.8 ⇓0.9 ⇓1.7 12.2 12.2 — ⇑2.1
No free will 12.2 10.0 ⇓2.2 ⇓3.6 14.8 9.5 ⇓5.3 ⇓5.9
Other 15.0 14.4 12.2 16.3
God
Theism 14.6 12.5 ⇓2.1 ⇓3.5 10.1 10.7 ⇑0.6 ⇑2.1
Atheism 72.8 74.2 ⇑1.4 ⇑3.5 78.6 77.2 ⇓1.4 ⇓2.1
Other 12.6 13.3 11.3 12.1
Knowledge
Empiricism 35.0 33.0 ⇓2.0 ⇓2.9 36.2 35.9 ⇓0.3 ⇑2.7
Rationalism 27.8 28.7 ⇑0.9 ⇑2.9 30.3 27.3 ⇓3.0 ⇓2.7
Other 37.2 38.3 33.5 36.8
Knowledge claims
Contextualism 40.1 42.4 ⇑2.3 ⇑7.6 39.2 40.1 ⇑0.9 ⇑6.1
Relativism 2.9 2.6 ⇓0.3 ⇑3.6 4.2 2.4 ⇓1.8 ⇑2.1
Invariantism 31.1 21.0 ⇓10.1 ⇓11.2 31.5 22.8 ⇓8.7 ⇓8.2
Other 25.9 34.0 25.1 34.7
Laws of nature
Humean 24.7 24.4 ⇓0.3 ⇑8.5 25.2 25.8 ⇑0.6 ⇑3.9
Non-humean 57.1 48.3 ⇓8.8 ⇓8.5 52.5 49.3 ⇓3.2 ⇓3.9
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Qs and As Comparable departments Same people
09% 20% ch. Swng 09% 20% ch. Swng
Other 18.2 27.3 22.3 24.9
Logic
Classical 51.6 39.8 ⇓11.8 ⇓13.4 52.5 44.5 ⇓8.0 ⇓9.5
Non-classical 15.4 17.0 ⇑1.6 ⇑13.4 13.6 15.1 ⇑1.5 ⇑9.5
Other 33.0 43.2 33.9 40.4
Mental content
Internalism 20.0 18.2 ⇓1.8 ⇓0.8 19.9 21.1 ⇑1.2 ⇑4.5
Externalism 51.1 50.2 ⇓0.9 ⇑0.8 51.3 48.1 ⇓3.2 ⇓4.5
Other 28.9 31.6 28.8 30.8
Meta-ethics
Moral realism 56.4 59.9 ⇑3.5 ⇑5.4 54.9 56.4 ⇑1.5 ⇑4.5
Moral anti-realism 27.7 25.8 ⇓1.9 ⇓5.4 30.6 27.6 ⇓3.0 ⇓4.5
Other 15.9 14.3 14.5 16.0
Metaphilosophy
Naturalism 49.8 43.2 ⇓6.6 ⇓3.4 47.5 49.0 ⇑1.5 ⇑5.6
Non-naturalism 25.9 22.7 ⇓3.2 ⇑3.4 27.0 22.8 ⇓4.2 ⇓5.6
Other 24.3 34.1 25.5 28.2
Mind
Physicalism 56.5 57.4 ⇑0.9 ⇑2.2 61.1 59.3 ⇓1.8 ⇓2.4
Non-physicalism 27.1 25.8 ⇓1.3 ⇓2.2 24.3 24.9 ⇑0.6 ⇑2.4
Other 16.4 16.8 14.6 15.8
Moral judgment
Cognitivism 65.7 63.4 ⇓2.3 ⇓2.9 69.1 62.9 ⇓6.2 ⇓8.3
Non-cognitivism 17.0 17.6 ⇑0.6 ⇑2.9 16.6 18.7 ⇑2.1 ⇑8.3
Other 17.3 19.0 14.3 18.4
Moral motivation
Internalism 34.9 29.6 ⇓5.3 ⇓8.7 34.7 32.6 ⇓2.1 —
Externalism 29.8 33.2 ⇑3.4 ⇑8.7 34.7 32.6 ⇓2.1 —
Other 35.3 37.2 30.6 34.8
Newcomb’s problem
One box 21.3 20.1 ⇓1.2 ⇓1.0 23.1 21.7 ⇓1.4 —
Two boxes 31.4 31.2 ⇓0.2 ⇑1.0 35.0 33.5 ⇓1.5 —
Other 47.3 48.7 41.9 44.8
Normative ethics
Deontology 25.9 22.5 ⇓3.4 ⇓2.2 22.8 20.8 ⇓2.0 ⇓0.6
Consequentialism 23.6 21.3 ⇓2.3 ⇓0.7 29.4 23.7 ⇓5.7 ⇓5.9
Virtue ethics 18.2 18.2 — ⇑2.9 16.0 18.7 ⇑2.7 ⇑6.5
Other 32.3 38.0 31.8 36.8
Perceptual experience
Disjunctivism 11.0 11.1 ⇑0.1 ⇑1.8 9.2 8.6 ⇓0.6 ⇑1.2
Qualia theory 12.2 10.8 ⇓1.4 ⇓0.3 16.6 12.2 ⇓4.4 ⇓4.0
Representationalism 31.5 28.9 ⇓2.6 ⇓1.9 28.2 28.5 ⇑0.3 ⇑2.4
Sense-datum theory 3.1 2.2 ⇓0.9 ⇑0.4 3.6 2.4 ⇓1.2 ⇑0.4
Other 42.2 47.0 42.4 48.3
Personal identity
Biological view 16.9 15.3 ⇓1.6 ⇓3.0 17.5 17.5 — ⇑0.5
Psychological view 33.6 37.0 ⇑3.4 ⇑4.6 35.6 37.7 ⇑2.1 ⇑3.6
Further-fact view 12.2 11.6 ⇓0.6 ⇓1.6 10.7 7.7 ⇓3.0 ⇓4.0
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Qs and As Comparable departments Same people
09% 20% ch. Swng 09% 20% ch. Swng
Other 37.3 36.1 36.2 37.1
Proper names
Fregean 28.7 27.0 ⇓1.7 ⇑0.6 27.6 25.5 ⇓2.1 ⇓0.9
Millian 34.5 32.3 ⇓2.2 ⇓0.6 35.9 34.7 ⇓1.2 ⇑0.9
Other 36.8 40.7 36.5 39.8
Science
Scientific realism 75.1 73.6 ⇓1.5 ⇓0.5 76.3 73.6 ⇓2.7 ⇓1.5
Scientific anti-realism 11.6 10.6 ⇓1.0 ⇑0.5 11.6 10.4 ⇓1.2 ⇑1.5
Other 13.3 15.8 12.1 16.0
Teletransporter
Survival 36.2 36.0 ⇓0.2 ⇓3.4 39.5 35.9 ⇓3.6 ⇓4.5
Death 31.1 34.3 ⇑3.2 ⇑3.4 32.9 33.8 ⇑0.9 ⇑4.5
Other 32.7 29.7 27.6 30.3
Time
A-theory 15.5 13.9 ⇓1.6 ⇓3.7 13.6 13.9 ⇑0.3 ⇑3.6
B-theory 26.3 28.4 ⇑2.1 ⇑3.7 30.3 27.0 ⇓3.3 ⇓3.6
Other 58.2 57.7 56.1 59.1
Trolley problem
Switch 68.2 66.2 ⇓2.0 ⇓6.3 74.8 67.4 ⇓7.4 ⇓11.9
Don’t switch 7.6 11.9 ⇑4.3 ⇑6.3 6.2 10.7 ⇑4.5 ⇑11.9
Other 24.2 21.9 19.0 21.9
Truth
Correspondence 50.8 44.4 ⇓6.4 ⇓5.1 48.1 46.3 ⇓1.8 ⇑0.6
Deflationary 24.8 23.8 ⇓1.0 ⇑2.9 29.4 24.6 ⇓4.8 ⇓3.9
Epistemic 6.9 5.4 ⇓1.5 ⇑2.2 4.7 4.7 — ⇑3.3
Other 17.5 26.4 17.8 24.4
Zombies
Inconceivable 16.0 13.1 ⇓2.9 ⇓1.9 18.7 16.0 ⇓2.7 ⇓1.6
Conceivable but not
pos.
35.6 36.9 ⇑1.3 ⇑4.5 35.9 32.3 ⇓3.6 ⇓3.0
Metaphysically possible 23.3 19.9 ⇓3.4 ⇓2.6 20.2 21.7 ⇑1.5 ⇑4.6
Other 25.1 30.1 25.2 30.0
6 Correlations
To calculate correlations, we first assigned a variable for each main answer option to a main
question. Its value for a respondent ranges from -2 to 2 depending on whether the respondent
rejects, leans toward rejecting, is neutral on (”agnostic”, ”too unclear to answer”, or ”no
fact of the matter”), leans toward accepting, or accepts the position corresponding to the
option. When a respondent selects “Accept: X” or “Lean toward: X” in the main interface
without evaluating multiple options, we consider that they also reject or lean against the
other options respectively. When they evaluate multiple options, we use those evaluations
separately. Respondents who gave answers falling under “other” but that are not considered
neutral were left out of correlation calculations for all relevant pairs of variables.
For demographic and orientation questions, each possible answer (e.g., “AOS: Feminist
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philosophy”) was assigned a variable whose value is 2 for a respondent who selected that
answer, 0 for respondents who specified another answer, and N/A for respondents who
skipped the question.
We calculated the Pearson correlation coefficient for every pair of variables in the study.
Tables 10-16 show the most correlated (or anti-correlated) variables across main answers,
main answers and geographic variables, main answers and year of birth, and main answers
and gender.
Table 11: Highest correlations between main answers
Answer A Answer B r n
A priori knowledge: yes Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes 0.51 1398
A priori knowledge: yes Knowledge: empiricism -0.36 1156
Abortion: permissible Consciousness: dualism -0.46 661
Abortion: permissible Cosmological fine-tuning: brute fact 0.35 540
Abortion: permissible Cosmological fine-tuning: design -0.74 542
Abortion: permissible Free will: compatibilism 0.35 943
Abortion: permissible Free will: libertarianism -0.45 940
Abortion: permissible Gender: biological -0.36 840
Abortion: permissible Gender: social 0.37 846
Abortion: permissible Gender categories: preserve -0.44 687
Abortion: permissible God: theism -0.68 932
Abortion: permissible Human genetic eng.: permissible 0.38 746
Abortion: permissible Immortality: yes -0.36 782
Abortion: permissible Meaning of life: objective -0.45 817
Abortion: permissible Metaphilosophy: naturalism 0.44 787
Abortion: permissible Mind: physicalism 0.44 896
Abstract objects: Platonism Consciousness: dualism 0.38 649
Abstract objects: Platonism Knowledge: empiricism -0.45 996
Abstract objects: Platonism Meta-ethics: moral realism 0.39 1159
Abstract objects: Platonism Metaontology: heavyweight realism 0.39 458
Abstract objects: Platonism Morality: non-naturalism 0.36 700
Abstract objects: Platonism Possible worlds: nonexistent -0.36 757
Abstract objects: Platonism Properties: transcendent universals 0.55 478
Abstract objects: Platonism Propositions: nonexistent -0.49 514
Abstract objects: Platonism Propositions: structured entities 0.36 515
Aesthetic value: objective Cosmological fine-tuning: design 0.39 525
Aesthetic value: objective Meaning of life: objective 0.55 1098
Aesthetic value: objective Meaning of life: subjective -0.38 1099
Aesthetic value: objective Meta-ethics: moral realism 0.51 1236
Aesthetic value: objective Metaontology: heavyweight realism 0.36 455
Aesthetic value: objective Moral judgment: cognitivism 0.38 1174
Aesthetic value: objective Practical reason: Humean -0.4 608
Aesthetic value: objective Well-being: objective list 0.41 636
Arguments for theism: cosmological Cosmological fine-tuning: design 0.38 444
Chinese room: understands Consciousness: dualism -0.37 572
Concepts: nativism Knowledge: empiricism -0.39 517
Consciousness: dualism Cosmological fine-tuning: design 0.56 465
Consciousness: dualism Free will: libertarianism 0.43 720
Consciousness: dualism God: theism 0.47 693
Consciousness: dualism Grounds of intentionality: primitive 0.36 385
Consciousness: dualism Hard problem of consc.: yes 0.39 612
Consciousness: dualism Meaning of life: objective 0.41 619
Consciousness: dualism Metaphilosophy: naturalism -0.55 622
Consciousness: dualism Mind: physicalism -0.73 712
Consciousness: dualism Morality: non-naturalism 0.51 582
Consciousness: dualism Personal identity: further-fact view 0.36 586
Consciousness: dualism Zombies: metaphysically possible 0.41 622
Consciousness: functionalism Cosmological fine-tuning: design -0.36 465
Consciousness: functionalism Mind: physicalism 0.47 714
Cosmological fine-tuning: brute fact God: theism -0.39 592
Cosmological fine-tuning: design Free will: compatibilism -0.37 615
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Answer A Answer B r n
Cosmological fine-tuning: design Free will: libertarianism 0.54 614
Cosmological fine-tuning: design Gender categories: preserve 0.42 432
Cosmological fine-tuning: design God: theism 0.78 592
Cosmological fine-tuning: design Human genetic eng.: permissible -0.36 492
Cosmological fine-tuning: design Immortality: yes 0.39 518
Cosmological fine-tuning: design Meaning of life: objective 0.58 524
Cosmological fine-tuning: design Meaning of life: subjective -0.36 526
Cosmological fine-tuning: design Meta-ethics: moral realism 0.36 596
Cosmological fine-tuning: design Metaphilosophy: naturalism -0.55 530
Cosmological fine-tuning: design Mind: physicalism -0.53 581
Cosmological fine-tuning: design Morality: non-naturalism 0.43 498
Cosmological fine-tuning: design Personal identity: further-fact view 0.39 478
Cosmological fine-tuning: design Personal identity: psychological view -0.36 480
Cosmological fine-tuning: design Practical reason: Aristotelian 0.39 397
Cosmological fine-tuning: multiverse Quantum mechanics: many-worlds 0.57 258
Eating animals/products of: om-
nivorism
Environmental ethics: anthropocentric 0.36 745
Epistemic justification: internalism Justif.: nonreliabilist found. 0.45 644
Epistemic justification: internalism Justif.: reliabilism -0.47 647
Epistemic justification: internalism Mental content: internalism 0.46 1052
Experience machine: yes Well-being: objective list -0.35 694
External world: non-skeptical realism Metaontology: anti-realism -0.36 517
External world: non-skeptical realism Science: scientific realism 0.36 1376
Footbridge: push Normative ethics: consequentialism 0.46 1133
Footbridge: push Trolley problem: switch 0.35 1221
Foundations of math: cons/intuit Metaontology: anti-realism 0.43 232
Free will: libertarianism God: theism 0.49 1347
Free will: libertarianism Metaphilosophy: naturalism -0.41 1139
Free will: libertarianism Mind: physicalism -0.45 1319
Gender: biological Gender categories: preserve 0.47 733
Gender: biological Race: biological 0.45 1239
Gender: social Gender categories: preserve -0.45 745
Gender: social Gender categories: revise 0.36 748
Gender: social Race: social 0.45 1254
Gender categories: eliminate Race categories: eliminate 0.41 598
Gender categories: preserve Politics: capitalism 0.4 593
Gender categories: preserve Race: biological 0.35 743
Gender categories: preserve Race categories: preserve 0.4 597
Gender categories: revise Race categories: revise 0.45 597
God: theism Human genetic eng.: permissible -0.4 774
God: theism Immortality: yes 0.37 857
God: theism Meaning of life: objective 0.53 1165
God: theism Metaphilosophy: naturalism -0.51 1102
God: theism Mind: physicalism -0.55 1289
God: theism Morality: non-naturalism 0.37 794
God: theism Practical reason: Humean -0.35 643
God: theism Principle of sufficient reason: true 0.38 670
Grounds of intentionality:
causal/teleo.
Theory of reference: causal 0.4 379
Grounds of intentionality: phenomenal Propositional attitudes: phenomenal 0.4 371
Hard problem of consc.: yes Mind: physicalism -0.35 797
Justif.: nonreliabilist found. Morality: non-naturalism 0.35 553
Knowledge: empiricism Laws of nature: Humean 0.37 980
Knowledge: empiricism Metaontology: heavyweight realism -0.35 419
Knowledge: empiricism Metaphilosophy: naturalism 0.47 951
Knowledge: empiricism Mind: physicalism 0.37 1079
Knowledge: empiricism Morality: non-naturalism -0.38 663
Knowledge: empiricism Practical reason: Humean 0.37 558
Laws of nature: Humean Meaning of life: objective -0.36 1019
Laws of nature: Humean Meta-ethics: moral realism -0.35 1170
Laws of nature: Humean Practical reason: Humean 0.39 592
Logic: classical True contradictions: actual -0.35 613
Logic: classical True contradictions: impossible 0.38 613
Meaning of life: objective Meta-ethics: moral realism 0.49 1169
Meaning of life: objective Metaphilosophy: naturalism -0.45 983
Meaning of life: objective Mind: physicalism -0.42 1122
Meaning of life: objective Moral judgment: cognitivism 0.37 1122
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Answer A Answer B r n
Meaning of life: objective Morality: non-naturalism 0.39 690
Meaning of life: objective Practical reason: Aristotelian 0.38 585
Meaning of life: objective Practical reason: Humean -0.49 584
Meaning of life: objective Well-being: desire satisfaction -0.35 621
Meaning of life: objective Well-being: objective list 0.47 620
Mental content: internalism Theory of reference: descriptive 0.41 566
Meta-ethics: moral realism Metaontology: anti-realism -0.35 508
Meta-ethics: moral realism Metaontology: heavyweight realism 0.42 511
Meta-ethics: moral realism Moral judgment: cognitivism 0.61 1333
Meta-ethics: moral realism Morality: error theory -0.39 832
Meta-ethics: moral realism Morality: expressivism -0.49 833
Meta-ethics: moral realism Morality: non-naturalism 0.38 831
Meta-ethics: moral realism Practical reason: Humean -0.42 655
Metaontology: anti-realism Science: scientific realism -0.52 498
Metaontology: deflationary realism Truth: correspondence -0.41 486
Metaontology: deflationary realism Truth: deflationary 0.44 485
Metaontology: heavyweight realism Moral judgment: cognitivism 0.41 481
Metaontology: heavyweight realism Morality: expressivism -0.35 436
Metaontology: heavyweight realism Spacetime: relationism -0.37 278
Metaontology: heavyweight realism Theory of reference: deflationary -0.4 376
Metaontology: heavyweight realism Truth: correspondence 0.53 487
Metaontology: heavyweight realism Truth: deflationary -0.49 486
Metaphilosophy: naturalism Mind: physicalism 0.65 1083
Metaphilosophy: naturalism Morality: naturalist realism 0.36 698
Metaphilosophy: naturalism Morality: non-naturalism -0.61 693
Metaphilosophy: naturalism Personal identity: further-fact view -0.36 877
Metaphilosophy: naturalism Phil. method: empirical phil. 0.45 1166
Metaphilosophy: naturalism Practical reason: Humean 0.41 577
Mind: physicalism Morality: non-naturalism -0.43 762
Mind uploading: survival Personal identity: psychological view 0.37 623
Mind uploading: survival Teletransporter: survival 0.68 693
Moral judgment: cognitivism Morality: expressivism -0.48 813
Moral principles: moral generalism Normative ethics: virtue ethics -0.42 716
Morality: non-naturalism Personal identity: further-fact view 0.4 629
Normative ethics: consequentialism Practical reason: Humean 0.5 632
Normative ethics: deontology Practical reason: Kantian 0.51 628
Normative ethics: virtue ethics Practical reason: Aristotelian 0.52 635
Personal identity: psychological view Teletransporter: survival 0.37 914
Political philosophy: libertarianism Politics: capitalism 0.52 636
Politics: capitalism Race: biological 0.38 749
Possible worlds: abstract Propositions: nonexistent -0.44 505
Possible worlds: concrete Quantum mechanics: many-worlds 0.39 306
Possible worlds: nonexistent Propositions: nonexistent 0.46 504
Practical reason: Humean Time: A-theory -0.36 324
Practical reason: Humean Well-being: objective list -0.42 499
Proper names: Fregean Theory of reference: descriptive 0.39 491
Properties: nonexistent Propositions: nonexistent 0.46 373
Race: unreal Race categories: eliminate 0.36 667
Temporal ontology: eternalism Time: A-theory -0.73 413
Temporal ontology: eternalism Time travel: metaphysically possible 0.39 426
Temporal ontology: growing block Time: A-theory 0.38 412
Temporal ontology: presentism Time: A-theory 0.62 414
Temporal ontology: presentism Time travel: metaphysically possible -0.36 426
Theory of reference: deflationary Truth: correspondence -0.44 583
Theory of reference: deflationary Truth: deflationary 0.43 582
Table 12: Highest correlations between region of affiliation and main answers
Region Answer r n
Region of affiliation: Canada Well-being: objective list -0.14 765
Region of affiliation: Europe Aim of philosophy: wisdom -0.1 1516
Region of affiliation: Europe Capital punishment: permissible -0.15 1028
Region of affiliation: Europe Human genetic eng.: permissible -0.15 875
Region of affiliation: Europe Moral judgment: cognitivism -0.12 1453
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Region Answer r n
Region of affiliation: Europe Political philosophy: libertarianism 0.12 1198
Region of affiliation: Europe Race: social -0.21 1413
Region of affiliation: Europe Race: unreal 0.18 1383
Region of affiliation: Europe Race categories: revise -0.14 736
Region of affiliation: UK Perceptual experience: disjunctivism 0.13 934
Region of affiliation: Latin America Arguments for theism: moral 0.15 752
Region of affiliation: US Capital punishment: permissible 0.15 1028
Region of affiliation: US God: theism 0.12 1508
Region of affiliation: US Immortality: yes 0.13 951
Region of affiliation: US Meaning of life: objective 0.12 1296
Region of affiliation: US Meta-ethics: moral realism 0.12 1501
Region of affiliation: US Moral judgment: cognitivism 0.12 1453
Region of affiliation: US Normative ethics: consequentialism -0.13 1397
Region of affiliation: US Race: social 0.19 1413
Region of affiliation: US Race: unreal -0.13 1383
Region of affiliation: US Zombies: metaphysically possible 0.11 1237
Table 13: Highest correlations between nationality and main answers
Region Answer r n
Nationality: Canada Well-being: objective list -0.14 722
Nationality: Europe Aim of philosophy: wisdom -0.11 1410
Nationality: Europe Capital punishment: permissible -0.2 978
Nationality: Europe Human genetic eng.: permissible -0.14 831
Nationality: Europe Immortality: yes -0.15 896
Nationality: Europe Meta-ethics: moral realism -0.12 1398
Nationality: Europe Moral judgment: cognitivism -0.15 1353
Nationality: Europe Morality: expressivism 0.14 844
Nationality: Europe Race: social -0.22 1328
Nationality: Europe Race: unreal 0.19 1303
Nationality: Europe Race categories: eliminate 0.15 701
Nationality: Europe Race categories: revise -0.16 701
Nationality: UK Perceptual experience: disjunctivism 0.14 874
Nationality: UK Personal identity: biological view 0.14 1091
Nationality: UK Well-being: desire satisfaction -0.16 723
Nationality: Oceania Free will: compatibilism 0.11 1430
Nationality: Oceania Properties: classes 0.19 508
Nationality: Latin America Foundations of math: set-theoretic 0.22 363
Nationality: US Abortion: permissible -0.13 1001
Nationality: US Aim of philosophy: wisdom 0.12 1410
Nationality: US Capital punishment: permissible 0.19 978
Nationality: US Cosmological fine-tuning: design 0.17 611
Nationality: US Gender categories: eliminate -0.14 787
Nationality: US God: theism 0.17 1401
Nationality: US Hard problem of consc.: yes 0.13 860
Nationality: US Immortality: yes 0.17 896
Nationality: US Meaning of life: nonexistent -0.11 1204
Nationality: US Meaning of life: objective 0.13 1217
Nationality: US Meta-ethics: moral realism 0.13 1398
Nationality: US Moral judgment: cognitivism 0.14 1353
Nationality: US Normative ethics: consequentialism -0.13 1299
Nationality: US Perceptual experience: qualia theory 0.14 873
Nationality: US Properties: classes -0.19 508
Nationality: US Race: social 0.2 1328
Nationality: US Race: unreal -0.15 1303
Nationality: US Zombies: metaphysically possible 0.12 1149
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Table 14: Highest correlations between region of PhD and main answers
Region Region r n
Region of PhD: Canada Analysis of knowledge: justified true
belief
0.17 645
Region of PhD: Europe Meta-ethics: moral realism -0.14 1052
Region of PhD: Europe Political philosophy: libertarianism 0.14 818
Region of PhD: Europe Race: social -0.15 970
Region of PhD: UK Analysis of knowledge: justified true
belief
-0.15 645
Region of PhD: UK Analysis of knowledge: no analysis 0.21 644
Region of PhD: UK Perceptual experience: disjunctivism 0.18 661
Region of PhD: Oceania Morality: error theory 0.16 650
Region of PhD: Oceania Practical reason: Humean 0.17 537
Region of PhD: Oceania Proper names: Fregean 0.15 668
Region of PhD: Oceania Properties: classes 0.21 388
Region of PhD: Oceania True contradictions: possible but non-
actual
0.17 589
Region of PhD: US God: theism 0.15 1054
Region of PhD: US Knowledge: empiricism -0.14 858
Region of PhD: US Meaning of life: objective 0.14 902
Region of PhD: US Meta-ethics: moral realism 0.13 1052
Region of PhD: US Moral judgment: cognitivism 0.13 1022
Region of PhD: US Properties: classes -0.21 388
Region of PhD: US Race: social 0.14 970
Table 15: Highest correlations between year of birth and main answers
Answer r n
Eating animals/products of: veganism 0.26 1445
Eating animals/products of: omnivorism -0.24 1447
External-world skepticism: dogmatist 0.21 699
Interlevel metaphysics: grounding 0.2 495
Gender: biological -0.2 1263
Race: social 0.2 1305
Time travel: metaphysically possible 0.19 726
Gender: social 0.16 1276
External-world skepticism: semantic externalist 0.16 697
Phil. method: conceptual engineering 0.15 1468
Morality: non-naturalism 0.15 828
Immortality: yes 0.15 890
Phil. method: empirical phil. 0.14 1468
Phil. method: formal philosophy 0.13 1468
Race: biological -0.13 1305
Race: unreal -0.12 1281
Table 16: Highest correlations between gender:female and main answers
Answer r n
Material composition: nihilism 0.2 390
Politics: capitalism -0.2 845
External-world skepticism: pragmatic 0.19 738
Environmental ethics: anthropocentric -0.17 788
Gender: social 0.17 1349
Race: social 0.17 1383
Eating animals/products of: omnivorism -0.16 1533
Immortality: yes -0.16 932
Morality: constructivism 0.16 874
Gender: biological -0.15 1334
Capital punishment: permissible -0.15 1012
Eating animals/products of: vegetarianism 0.14 1535
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Answer r n
Gender categories: preserve -0.14 799
Values in science: necessarily value-laden 0.14 862
Laws of nature: Humean 0.14 1291
Race: biological -0.14 1382
External world: idealism 0.13 1543
Truth: epistemic 0.13 1322
Trolley problem: switch -0.13 1290
Eating animals/products of: veganism 0.13 1531
Footbridge: push -0.12 1312
External world: non-skeptical realism -0.1 1540
Table 17: Highest correlations between areas of specialization and main answers
AOS Answer r n
17th/18th Century Phil. Consciousness: panpsychism 0.18 775
17th/18th Century Phil. Practical reason: Kantian 0.16 726
19th Century Phil. External world: idealism 0.21 1550
19th Century Phil. Justif.: coherentism 0.17 726
19th Century Phil. True contradictions: impossible -0.17 804
19th Century Phil. Truth: correspondence -0.15 1331
Ancient Greek and Roman Phil. Normative ethics: virtue ethics 0.15 1375
Ancient Greek and Roman Phil. Political philosophy: communitarian-
ism
0.16 1181
Ancient Greek and Roman Phil. Practical reason: Aristotelian 0.26 729
Ancient Greek and Roman Phil. Practical reason: Humean -0.22 728
Applied Ethics Analysis of knowledge: no analysis -0.15 867
Asian Phil. Consciousness: panpsychism 0.2 775
Asian Phil. Material composition: nihilism 0.21 399
Continental Phil. External world: idealism 0.18 1550
Continental Phil. Justif.: infinitism 0.17 716
Continental Phil. Method hist. phil.: analytic/rational
reconstruction
-0.21 807
Continental Phil. Mind: physicalism -0.16 1420
Continental Phil. Propositional attitudes: representa-
tional
-0.22 630
Continental Phil. Science: scientific realism -0.19 1433
Continental Phil. True contradictions: actual 0.19 804
Continental Phil. True contradictions: impossible -0.21 804
Decision Theory Mind uploading: survival 0.16 815
Decision Theory Politics: capitalism 0.15 864
Decision Theory Practical reason: Humean 0.22 728
Epistemology Justif.: coherentism -0.15 726
Epistemology Justif.: nonreliabilist found. 0.18 725
Epistemology Knowledge claims: contextualism -0.19 1202
Epistemology Knowledge claims: invariantism 0.16 1199
Epistemology External-world skepticism: dogmatist 0.16 740
General Phil. of Science Knowledge: empiricism 0.16 1213
General Phil. of Science Phil. method: intuition-based -0.17 1570
General Phil. of Science Principle of sufficient reason: true -0.16 744
Logic and Phil. of Logic Phil. method: formal philosophy 0.19 1570
Logic and Phil. of Logic Wittgenstein: early 0.15 783
Medieval and Renaissance Phil. Abortion: permissible -0.3 1046
Medieval and Renaissance Phil. Arguments for theism: cosmological 0.2 752
Medieval and Renaissance Phil. Causation: primitive 0.16 692
Medieval and Renaissance Phil. Cosmological fine-tuning: brute fact -0.17 643
Medieval and Renaissance Phil. Cosmological fine-tuning: design 0.33 644
Medieval and Renaissance Phil. Free will: libertarianism 0.17 1513
Medieval and Renaissance Phil. God: theism 0.27 1479
Medieval and Renaissance Phil. Material composition: restrictivism 0.22 399
Medieval and Renaissance Phil. Mind uploading: survival -0.16 815
Medieval and Renaissance Phil. Practical reason: Aristotelian 0.27 729
Medieval and Renaissance Phil. Practical reason: Humean -0.21 728
Medieval and Renaissance Phil. Practical reason: Kantian -0.16 726
Medieval and Renaissance Phil. Principle of sufficient reason: true 0.16 744
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AOS Answer r n
Medieval and Renaissance Phil. Propositions: acts 0.17 596
Meta-Ethics Interlevel metaphysics: grounding 0.21 522
Meta-Ethics Phil. method: intuition-based 0.16 1570
Metaphilosophy Interlevel metaphysics: identity 0.24 515
Metaphysics Abstract objects: Platonism 0.18 1281
Metaphysics Continuum hypothesis: determinate 0.24 308
Metaphysics Cosmological fine-tuning: design 0.17 644
Metaphysics Extended mind: yes -0.17 828
Metaphysics Justif.: coherentism -0.21 726
Metaphysics Justif.: nonreliabilist found. 0.18 725
Metaphysics Knowledge: empiricism -0.16 1213
Metaphysics Material composition: nihilism -0.22 399
Metaphysics Metaontology: anti-realism -0.2 538
Metaphysics Metaontology: deflationary realism -0.23 539
Metaphysics Metaontology: heavyweight realism 0.3 541
Metaphysics Method hist. phil.: analytic/rational
reconstruction
0.19 807
Metaphysics Morality: constructivism -0.17 883
Metaphysics Properties: classes -0.18 536
Metaphysics External-world skepticism: pragmatic -0.19 749
Metaphysics Science: scientific realism 0.15 1433
Metaphysics Spacetime: relationism -0.25 450
Metaphysics Temporal ontology: eternalism 0.2 543
Metaphysics Temporal ontology: growing block -0.21 541
Metaphysics Truth: epistemic -0.18 1327
Metaphysics Wittgenstein: early 0.2 783
Normative Ethics Moral principles: moral generalism 0.2 844
Phil. of Biology Propositional attitudes: nonexistent 0.17 616
Phil. of Cognitive Science Consciousness: dualism -0.18 774
Phil. of Cognitive Science Grounds of intentionality:
causal/teleo.
0.18 545
Phil. of Cognitive Science Hard problem of consc.: yes -0.17 899
Phil. of Cognitive Science Justif.: nonreliabilist found. -0.15 725
Phil. of Cognitive Science Metaphilosophy: naturalism 0.21 1225
Phil. of Cognitive Science Mind: physicalism 0.21 1420
Phil. of Cognitive Science Phil. method: empirical phil. 0.22 1570
Phil. of Cognitive Science Phil. method: experimental philoso-
phy
0.15 1570
Phil. of Language Abstract objects: Platonism 0.15 1281
Phil. of Language Phil. method: linguistic philosophy 0.23 1570
Phil. of Language Possible worlds: nonexistent -0.16 929
Phil. of Language Principle of sufficient reason: true -0.18 744
Phil. of Language External-world skepticism: contextu-
alist
0.18 737
Phil. of Mind Perceptual experience: sense-datum
theory
-0.15 918
Phil. of Mind Properties: tropes 0.19 538
Phil. of Religion Abortion: permissible -0.44 1046
Phil. of Religion Aesthetic value: objective 0.16 1342
Phil. of Religion Arguments for theism: cosmological 0.15 752
Phil. of Religion Capital punishment: permissible 0.18 1024
Phil. of Religion Causation: counterfactual/difference-
making
-0.18 701
Phil. of Religion Causation: primitive 0.21 692
Phil. of Religion Chinese room: understands -0.16 861
Phil. of Religion Consciousness: dualism 0.3 774
Phil. of Religion Consciousness: functionalism -0.23 776
Phil. of Religion Cosmological fine-tuning: brute fact -0.26 643
Phil. of Religion Cosmological fine-tuning: design 0.53 644
Phil. of Religion Cosmological fine-tuning: multiverse -0.2 644
Phil. of Religion Cosmological fine-tuning: no fine-
tuning
-0.2 640
Phil. of Religion Free will: compatibilism -0.23 1516
Phil. of Religion Free will: libertarianism 0.29 1513
Phil. of Religion Gender: social -0.15 1364
Phil. of Religion Gender categories: preserve 0.21 813
Phil. of Religion Gender categories: revise -0.15 816
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AOS Answer r n
Phil. of Religion God: theism 0.43 1479
Phil. of Religion Immortality: yes 0.26 946
Phil. of Religion Laws of nature: Humean -0.15 1286
Phil. of Religion Meaning of life: nonexistent -0.16 1265
Phil. of Religion Meaning of life: objective 0.26 1281
Phil. of Religion Meaning of life: subjective -0.17 1283
Phil. of Religion Meta-ethics: moral realism 0.16 1476
Phil. of Religion Metaontology: heavyweight realism 0.2 541
Phil. of Religion Metaphilosophy: naturalism -0.3 1225
Phil. of Religion Mind: physicalism -0.24 1420
Phil. of Religion Morality: constructivism -0.17 883
Phil. of Religion Morality: non-naturalism 0.24 879
Phil. of Religion Personal identity: further-fact view 0.18 1142
Phil. of Religion Personal identity: psychological view -0.18 1153
Phil. of Religion Politics: capitalism 0.2 864
Phil. of Religion Practical reason: Aristotelian 0.15 729
Phil. of Religion Principle of sufficient reason: true 0.21 744
Phil. of Religion Semantic content: minimalism 0.16 666
Phil. of Religion Well-being: objective list 0.17 758
Social and Political Phil. Justif.: coherentism 0.15 726
Social and Political Phil. Morality: constructivism 0.16 883
Social and Political Phil. Normative ethics: deontology 0.17 1372
Social and Political Phil. Political philosophy: communitarian-
ism
-0.2 1181
Social and Political Phil. Political philosophy: egalitarianism 0.17 1184
7 Selection bias
Selection bias arises when the group who responds to a survey question is not a random
sample of the target population. In our survey, selection bias takes two forms. First,
the philosophers who respond to the survey at all (completing at least 50 questions and
consenting) are not a random sample of the target population. We call this respondent bias.
Second, respondents have the option to complete more than 50 (up to 100) questions, and
the group who do so are not a random sample of the overall group of respondents. We call
this enthusiast bias.
The results presented in section 2 are subject to respondent bias and enthusiast bias,
so they cannot be considered accurate guides to the distribution of views in our target
population as a whole. To use survey responses to assess the distribution of views in our
target population as a whole, we need to correct for respondent bias and enthusiast bias.
Enthusiast bias: Enthusiast bias does not affect the 40 main questions, which all respon-
dents answered as part of their 50 mandatory questions. It affects only the 60 additional
questions.
To correct for enthusiast bias on these questions, we can simply restrict our analysis to
those “First 50” respondents who answered these questions as part of their 50 mandatory
questions. This group should be a random sample of respondents as a whole. This infor-
mation is shown in table 21 under the “F50” column. Enthusiast bias is reflected in the
difference between the “All” column and the “F50” column.
We can also assess enthusiast bias by calculating correlations between the number of
questions answered by a respondent and their various answers to questions. The highest
correlations are shown in table 18.
36






Region of PhD: US 0.09
AOS: Tradition: 58 -0.06
Region of affiliation: Canada -0.06
Nationality: US 0.05
Respondent bias: It is less straightforward to assess and correct for respondent bias, as
we have less information on philosophers in the target population who did not participate
in the survey. Publicly available information typically includes AOS, affiliation, and Ph.D.
institution, and gender can be estimated using names. We can use this information to
assess and correct for respondent bias with respect to these features. The biases that we
have identified are summarized in table 19. Tables 20 and 21 summarize the main and
additional results (respectively) corrected for AOS and gender. We did not make regional
corrections because regions of affiliation are not very strongly correlated with philosophical
views (see table 12) and the number of data points at our disposal did not allow a three-way
stratification of respondents.
Table 19: Biases as proportion of respondents divided by proportion of population for (a)






















It remains possible and likely that there are respondent biases that go beyond AOS,
gender, and region of affiliation, but our ability to measure them is limited by the limited
information that we have about nonrespondents in the target population.
[Still coming: expert specialization effects, order effects.]
Table 20: Bias corrections for the 40 main questions. All = pct. of all answers. Cor = Pct. of
answers with gender and specialization correction applied. Corrections of 3% or more are
starred.












































Externalism 49.3 46.13 *
Meta-ethics
Moral realism 59.8 57.74
















One box 18.7 17.35




Virtue ethics 36.1 38.34
Perceptual experience
Disjunctivism 11.6 11.05
Qualia theory 11.2 10.91
Representationalism 29.1 26.56
Sense-datum theory 3.7 3.85
Personal identity
Biological view 17.3 16.43
Psychological view 39.5 39.46







Millian 27.5 24.4 *
Science
Scientific realism 68.5 64.74 *








Switch 61.7 58.64 *
Don’t switch 12.9 12.84
Truth




Questions and answers All Cor.
Zombies
Inconceivable 14.8 14.0
Conceivable but not pos. 32.9 32.66







Eating animals and animal products
Omnivorism (yes and yes) 47.5 46.9
Vegetarianism (no and yes) 26.2 26.75


















A little 46.3 46.76
A lot 41.5 38.28 *
Philosophical methods
Conceptual analysis 68.9 69.47
Conceptual engineering 38.3 36.63
Empirical philosophy 58.3 57.37
Experimental philosophy 31.7 31.36
Formal philosophy 53.9 50.38 *
Intuition-based philosophy 48.0 45.36








Semantic 41.8 38.69 *
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Questions and answers All Cor.
Table 21: Bias corrections for the additional questions. All = pct. of all answers. F50 =
pct. of answers among respondents’ mandatory questions (the first 50). Cor = F50 with
gender and specialization correction. Corrections of 3% or more are starred.
Questions and answers All F50 Cor.
Abortion
Permissible 77.7 79.0 77.71
Impermissible 12.5 12.7 12.92
Aesthetic experience
Perception 17.2 16.9 16.15
Pleasure 8.6 9.4 8.97
Sui generis 22.7 21.6 23.8
Analysis of knowledge
Justified true belief 21.4 22.9 24.93
Other analysis 29.2 32.5 30.49
No analysis 27.8 25.7 22.66 *
Arguments for theism
Cosmological 18.8 14.9 14.18
Design 15.9 13.6 12.51
Ontological 8.0 8.0 9.1
Pragmatic 12.8 13.3 15.49
Moral 8.4 10.2 10.9
Belief or credence
Belief 20.8 22.6 21.8
Credence 21.2 20.5 20.3
Neither 13.2 12.1 10.75
Capital punishment
Permissible 17.1 17.1 15.46
Impermissible 72.4 73.9 75.37
Causation
Counterfactual/difference-making 28.9 32.8 32.17
Process/production 17.5 16.6 16.44
Primitive 15.9 15.3 13.63
Nonexistent 3.2 3.1 2.77
Chinese room
Understands 16.0 16.2 14.23
Doesn’t understand 60.0 60.1 59.57
Concepts
Nativism 21.4 22.0 21.55
Empiricism 38.4 40.9 42.12
Consciousness
Dualism 19.4 17.9 15.12
Eliminativism 4.0 4.2 4.0
Functionalism 29.2 30.9 28.89
Identity theory 11.8 11.1 9.64
Panpsychism 6.7 6.2 8.0
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Questions and answers All F50 Cor.
Continuum hypothesis
Determinate 16.2 16.6 15.06
Indeterminate 12.3 10.2 9.77
Cosmological fine-tuning
Design 12.2 9.2 8.51
Multiverse 10.7 12.5 12.83
Brute fact 22.6 25.2 25.17
No fine-tuning 15.3 15.4 15.03
Environmental ethics
Anthropocentric 32.9 30.7 31.56
Non-anthropocentric 39.4 37.5 38.69
Extended mind
Yes 43.1 44.1 42.6
No 31.2 27.1 25.68
Foundations of mathematics
Constructivism/intuitionism 8.2 10.2 10.87
Formalism 3.3 2.1 2.32
Logicism 6.3 4.6 3.37
Structuralism 11.3 14.4 14.36
Set-theoretic 8.2 8.1 6.64
Gender categories
Preserve 17.4 17.2 15.14
Revise 43.2 48.3 48.42
Eliminate 13.8 17.2 18.66
Grounds of intentionality
Causal/teleological 21.9 21.9 20.61
Inferential 6.0 5.8 5.34
Interpretational 9.5 11.9 12.75
Phenomenal 7.9 7.7 9.92
Primitive 8.6 10.0 9.82
Hard problem of consciousness
Yes 54.6 56.0 54.63
No 26.0 23.2 25.01
Human genetic engineering
Permissible 58.8 56.3 53.14 *
Impermissible 17.8 17.3 19.75
Hume
Skeptic 28.0 30.4 30.27
Naturalist 42.2 39.5 44.11 *
Immortality
Yes 43.3 36.7 35.27
No 39.9 44.1 45.86
Interlevel metaphysics
Grounding 19.3 17.2 14.88
Identity 7.6 7.8 6.26
Realization 13.9 16.2 14.83
Supervenience 16.4 17.9 16.95
Justification
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Questions and answers All F50 Cor.
Coherentism 19.4 24.7 27.66
Infinitism 1.6 2.8 2.98
Nonreliabilist found. 20.7 17.4 14.37 *
Reliabilism 27.6 29.1 26.03 *
Kant
One world 28.8 33.2 36.68 *
Two worlds 22.1 22.5 23.18
Law
Legal positivism 21.8 22.4 23.6
Legal non-positivism 24.8 26.5 27.11
Material composition
Nihilism 4.1 6.1 4.97
Restrictivism 17.7 15.5 13.49
Universalism 13.9 11.3 9.02
Morality
Non-naturalism 23.8 24.8 24.4
Naturalist realism 28.4 27.7 27.45
Constructivism 18.7 20.1 22.3
Expressivism 9.5 10.5 8.11
Error theory 4.7 5.1 4.54
Metaontology
Heavyweight realism 24.0 24.2 20.36 *
Deflationary realism 17.5 18.8 17.76
Anti-realism 7.4 6.1 6.4
Method in history of philosophy
Analytic/rational reconstruction 49.3 49.8 50.05
Contextual/historicist 36.0 45.5 47.76
Method in political philosophy
Ideal theory 22.3 23.7 24.19
Non-ideal theory 39.9 43.1 45.92
Mind uploading
Survival 25.0 24.7 25.13
Death 49.4 51.7 51.92
Moral principles
Moral generalism 46.3 43.8 43.82
Moral particularism 28.6 31.0 31.99
Normative concepts
Fit 5.7 4.3 4.81
Ought 11.0 9.7 9.66
Reasons 19.7 24.8 27.72
Value 28.9 29.8 29.79
Other minds
Adult humans 89.3 91.8 90.78
Cats 83.1 83.9 81.84
Fish 61.3 61.8 60.18
Flies 32.4 32.7 34.67
Worms 22.7 22.4 23.99
Plants 6.8 7.0 7.91
Particles 1.9 1.2 0.97
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Questions and answers All F50 Cor.
Newborn babies 79.1 83.0 81.74
Current ai systems 3.2 3.3 3.94
Future ai systems 36.8 37.9 35.21
Ought implies can
Yes 59.3 56.7 57.24
No 26.7 27.3 28.07
Philosophical knowledge
None 3.4 3.6 4.23
A little 31.0 32.1 33.01
A lot 53.5 54.9 53.27
Plato
Knowledge only of forms 29.8 29.2 32.79 *
Knowledge also of concrete things 15.9 17.9 19.83
Politics
Capitalism 28.1 25.3 23.75
Socialism 50.5 50.7 54.28 *
Possible worlds
Abstract 50.0 51.3 47.25 *
Concrete 4.2 3.2 2.05
Nonexistent 27.4 25.6 28.8 *
Practical reason
Aristotelian 30.3 32.9 34.72
Humean 23.9 25.3 25.06
Kantian 14.8 15.8 16.15
Principle of sufficient reason
True 29.9 31.5 31.7
False 38.0 38.8 38.41
Properties
Classes 7.9 11.0 10.43
Immanent universals 14.3 18.2 16.62
Transcendent universals 13.7 16.5 14.57
Tropes 10.6 7.9 7.27
Nonexistent 5.6 3.1 3.83
Propositional attitudes
Dispositional 22.2 21.6 20.54
Phenomenal 4.9 4.2 5.39
Representational 32.7 30.9 24.75 *
Nonexistent 2.5 1.9 2.88
Propositions
Sets 5.9 5.5 4.74
Structured entities 27.2 25.4 22.88
Simple entities 4.9 7.1 6.26
Acts 5.8 5.8 6.72
Nonexistent 10.9 10.6 11.1
Quantum mechanics
Collapse 8.5 6.8 6.1
Hidden-variables 11.0 9.2 8.69
Many-worlds 9.7 8.2 8.53
Epistemic 6.4 6.1 5.79
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Questions and answers All F50 Cor.
Race categories
Preserve 6.5 8.3 7.87
Revise 25.8 27.2 28.93
Eliminate 32.3 33.3 33.83
Response to external-world skepticism
Abductive 18.1 16.2 15.8
Contextualist 8.8 9.3 8.58
Dogmatist 11.0 10.0 8.25
Epistemic externalist 15.5 16.9 16.0
Semantic externalist 6.9 9.0 8.06
Pragmatic 18.7 17.6 20.06
Rational disagreement
Non-permissivism 16.7 16.6 18.58
Permissivism 60.5 65.1 62.26
Semantic content








One-third 10.5 11.3 9.78
One-half 7.1 6.8 5.88
Spacetime
Relationism 25.1 24.7 29.05 *
Substantivalism 15.2 14.4 10.48 *
Statue and lump
One thing 25.4 25.6 25.41
Two things 35.3 37.4 34.17 *
Temporal ontology
Presentism 12.1 11.0 8.88
Eternalism 26.3 25.3 21.55 *
Growing block 11.2 10.1 10.45
Theory of reference
Causal 35.9 37.0 32.99 *
Descriptive 17.2 17.0 14.72
Deflationary 11.7 11.3 11.39
Time travel
Metaphysically possible 34.9 34.6 30.97 *
Metaphysically impossible 33.9 35.5 39.05 *
True contradictions
Impossible 58.5 54.2 44.78 *
Possible but non-actual 3.9 5.4 5.35
Actual 10.2 9.0 9.73
Units of selection
Genes 26.3 27.9 27.52
Organisms 26.0 26.9 28.43
Values in science
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Questions and answers All F50 Cor.
Necessarily value-free 15.3 17.2 15.58
Necessarily value-laden 38.0 40.7 42.69
Can be either 26.8 27.2 26.62
Well-being
Hedonism/experientialism 10.7 11.0 11.06
Desire satisfaction 15.6 17.9 16.19
Objective list 44.7 44.1 43.4
Wittgenstein
Early 20.7 19.8 18.58
Late 48.4 49.0 50.23
46
